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1 Introduction
The most popular approach to capture the way in which unemployment and
other real disturbances affect wages is the ubiquitous Phillips Curve. This
empirical and macroeconomic proposition suggests a stable relationship be-
tween unemployment and nominal wage growth, with higher unemployment
restraining wage changes. However, the original relationship and the empirical
applications that followed are usually criticized for lacking any microeconomic
theoretical foundation, except the principle that “when demand for labour is
high and there are very few unemployed we should expect employers to bid
wage rates up quite rapidly” (Phillips (1958)).
Recently, this debate has been revisited with Gali (2011) and Gali, Smets,
and Wouters (2011) providing plausible theoretical foundations to the dynamic
relation between wage inflation and unemployment. Indeed, by reformulating
the New Keynesian (NK) wage equation, Gali (2011) introduces unemploy-
ment to an otherwise standard NK model with staggered wage setting. Their
reformulation has the advantage of the observability of the associated driving
force (i.e. the unemployment rate), which contrasts with the unobservability
of the wage markup or the output gap, which are the driving forces in typi-
cal NK models. Under some assumptions, the proposed relation takes a form
similar to the empirical applications of the Phillips curve. Nonetheless, con-
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trary to the purely empirical proposition, the so-called New Keynesian Wage
Phillips Curve (NKWPC) is a microfounded structural relation between wage
inflation and unemployment, with coefficients that are functions of parameters
that have a structural interpretation. In particular, the slope of the curve is
decreasing in the degree of wage rigidity. In the limit, when wage rigidity ap-
proaches zero, i.e. the case of full flexibility, the curve becomes vertical (Gali
(2011)).
Based on this framework, we add to the literature by estimating reduced
form equations of the NKWPC. By doing so, we provide estimates of the
slope of the implied wage inflation-unemployment curve (given expected wage
inflation) for several advanced countries over the 1985q1-2014q3 period. To our
knowledge, our investigation is the first attempt to provide measures of wage
rigidity at the macroeconomic level for several countries. This is an important
contribution given the importance of wage rigidity not only for the validity
of several theoretical models but also given its perceived role as a factor of
macroeconomic stability.
Indeed, measuring wage rigidity is important for several reasons. First,
The New Keynesian Phillips curve, which has quickly become the principal
workhorse model in monetary economics, is based on the optimizing behavior
of price setters in the presence of nominal rigidities. Therefore, the existence
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of such “imperfections” has been pointed to by many authors as an aspect
needed to account for a number of labor market characteristics. Furthermore,
the introduction of real wage rigidities overcomes a well known empirical weak-
ness of the standard NK model, namely, its lack of inflation inertia.1 Second,
rigidities and frictions in the labor market might be crucial for understanding
sluggishness in firms’ marginal cost and their price setting behavior. As such,
rigidities have important implications for price competitiveness. Third, the
presence of sufficiently flexible wages and prices is seen as a factor of macroe-
conomic stability, in particular in economies that have joined a currency union
or adopted any other form of hard peg, for in those cases the exchange rate is
no longer available as an adjustment mechanism.2 Moreover, even in countries
with flexible exchange rate systems, rigidity is believed to cause unemployment
by limiting the adjustment of wages.
Albeit its importance, the empirical literature on wage rigidity at a macroe-
conomic level is very scarce. Indeed, most of the contributions are based on
individual and firm level data. Some of this literature rests on the idea that
wage rigidity can be estimated based on the assumption that there is a hypo-
thetical distribution of wage changes that would prevail if there was no rigidity
(notional distribution). Measures of wage rigidity can then be obtained from
1See, for instance, Hall (2005) and Blanchard and Gali (2007a).
2Wage rigidity was put forward as one of the explanations of high and persistent unem-
ployment in Europe when compared to the US (Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983)).
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the comparison of the notional and observed distribution as in Dickens et al.
(2007) or Altonji and Devereux (1999). More recent contributions capture
rigidity by looking at asymmetries in the wage change distribution.3
Even though vast, this literature has provided inconclusive results so far.
The reported degree of downward wage rigidity varies not only across different
approaches and countries but also between different datasets referring to the
same country. Furthermore, much of the previously cited studies focus on the
effect on the wage change distribution, whether the lower part of the distribu-
tion is compressed from below due to a nominal or real lower bound. Thus,
by concentrating mainly on the shape of the distribution, this literature does
not explore to what extent wages are affected by unemployment but only the
effect on the shape of the distribution. Furthermore, micro studies derive wage
rigidity from wage changes of individuals engaged in ongoing employment re-
lationships. However, if there are high worker turnover rates, wage rigidity
for job stayers may not translate into similar levels of rigidity at higher levels
of aggregation. Measuring wage rigidity at the macroeconomic level is thus
particularly acute.
In this paper, we go beyond the existing literature by analyzing the wage-
unemployment relationship at the aggregate level. Together with estimating
3See Altonji and Devereux (1999) for the first type of studies and Dickens et al. (2007),
Holden and Wulfsberg (2008), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) or Messina et. al (2010) for the
second case.
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the reduced form NKWPC, we are able to provide measures of wage rigidity
for our sample of countries. We pay special attention to European countries.
Indeed, the European Monetary Union has brought to the fore traditional ques-
tions related to the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory. These questions
concern the role played by relative price adjustment mechanisms and the diffi-
culties due to asymmetric evolutions among member countries. As mentioned
before, wage flexibility is proposed as a substitute to exchange rates adjust-
ment, at least partially. Moreover, it is argued that the current situation in
the euro area is mainly a current account deficit crisis and not only a public
finance crisis (Wasmer (2012)). In this context, the euro area will need huge
price and wage adjustments to ensure the stability of the Euro.
However, contrary to the classical logic, recent contributions suggest that
the impact of wage rigidity actually depends on the monetary policy rule in
place and notably the central bank’s response to inflation. Thus, this literature
questions the classical view that wage flexibility is particularly recommended
in a currency union (see Gali (2013) and Gali and Monacelli (2014)). Moreover,
during the recent crises and in a low and stable inflation environment, many
observers have highlighted the risk of wage deflation and the stagnation of the
economy, i.e. the experience of Japan between 1997 and 2003. In order to
save their jobs, many workers accepted downward revisions of their salaries or
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benefits. This mechanism, which can be seen as judicious at the individual
level, can prove disastrous when adopted at a large scale. In this context,
downward rigidity of wages can be seen as a way to prevent deflationary spirals.
Our results point to a substantial differences in the nature of wage rigidi-
ties in our sample of countries. In particular, we detect countries with high
and low real wage rigidity at the aggregate level and different degree of wage
indexation. We also evidence that the inflation wage-unemployment relation-
ship have exhibited profound shifts during our sample period. Indeed, our
analysis reveals an indexation easying as disinflation took place in most of the
countries. Moreover, wage rigidity have changed over time. Finally, we present
evidence that wage rigidity is not linked to the labor institutional environment
at the macroeconomic level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and the estimation methodology. Section 3 briefly describes the data set and
display the results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 From Theory to Estimation
At the aggregate level, the relationship between wages and unemployment can
be captured from the Phillips curve, that focuses on the relation between the
growth of nominal wage and the unemployment rate. This traditional Phillips
curve is seen as a simple ad hoc macroeconomic model without micro-founded
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relationships. In turn, Medium-scale New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) models, which are microfounded structures widely
used by central banks and other policy institutions, lack of a reference to
unemployment. This is unfortunate because unemployment is an important
indicator of economic activity and a central focus of the policy debate (Gali,
Smets, and Wouters (2011)).
However, recent contributions implant in the basic New Keynesian model
various theories of unemployment based on the presence of labor market fric-
tions. In particular, by reformulating the standard version of the NK wage
equation in terms unemployment, Gali (2011) shows that the staggered wage
setting model a` la Calvo imply a dynamic relation between wage inflation and
the unemployment rate. Under certain assumptions, the New Keynesian Wage
Phillips Curve takes the same form as the original equation of Phillips. Further-
more, in the presence of wage indexation to past inflation, the resulting wage
dynamics are consistent with a specification often used in applied work. This
model, which allows for involuntary unemployment while preserving the con-
venience of the representative household paradigm, asserts the Phillips curve
once more in the academic debate.
More in detail, Gali (2011) and Gali, Smets, and Wouters (2011) introduce
a variant of the staggered wage setting model originally developed in Erceg,
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Henderson, and Levin (2000), where workers (or unions) supplying a labor
service of a given type get to reset their nominal wage with probability 1− θ
each period and a fraction of workers θ keeping their wage unchanged in any
given period. The parameter θ, which follows the formalism of ?, is then a
natural index of nominal wage rigidity.
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), Gali (2011) derives the following
baseline wage inflation equation:
piwt = βEt{piwt+1} − λ(µt − µ) (1)
where where piwt is wage inflation, µt denotes the average wage markup and
µ is the desired level of µt. In Eq. 1, the parameter λ is defined as follows:
λ =
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ(1 + ϕ)
(2)
with θ denoting the index of wage rigidity (i.e. the Calvo wage rigidity
parameter), β the usual utility discount factor,  the (constant) wage elasticity
of demand for the services of each labor type and ϕ is defined latter on.
As seen, Equation (1) implies that wage inflation is a forward looking vari-
able, which depends positively on expected one period ahead wage inflation
and negatively on the deviation of the average wage markup from its desired
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value. Solving Equation (1) forward, the baseline wage inflation equation in
the NK framework is expressed as follows:
piwt = −λ
∞∑
k=0
βkEt{(µt+k − µ)} (3)
The previous Equation implies that wage inflation is proportional to the
discounted sum of expected deviations of current and future average wage
markups from their desired levels. Therefore, variations in wage inflation are
driven by deviations of average wage markup from its natural level, because
those deviations generate pressure on workers currently setting wages to adjust
those wages in one direction or another.
The model can be further extended to allow for automatic indexation to
price inflation of the wages that are not reoptimized in any given period. In
that case and with the indexation rule, the following wage inflation equation
can be derived:
piwt − γp¯ipt−1 = α + βEt{piwt+1 − γp¯ipt−1} − λ(µt − µ) (4)
where p¯ipt is the price inflation variable to which wages are indexed.
Now, since the wage markup is not directly observed in actual time series
data, Gali (2011) replaces this variable with the unemployment rate by assum-
ing that households find it optimal to participate in the labor market in period
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t if and only if the real wage prevailing in his trade is above his disutility from
working. Under this scenario, real wages depend positively on the aggregate
participation rate.4 Indeed, since unemployment is defined as the difference
between the participation rate and employment, it is straightforward to find
a simple linear relation between the wage markup, µt, and the unemployment
rate, ut:
µt = ϕut (5)
where ϕ is the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity.5
Finally, we can define the natural rate of unemployment as the rate of
unemployment that would prevail in the absence of nominal wage rigidities.
With a constant desired wage markup, unt is then a linear function of the
desired wage markup:
un =
µ
ϕ
(6)
By combining Equations (3), (4) and (5), we obtain the following aug-
mented New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve (NKWPC):
4See also Gali (1996) and Blanchard and Gali (2007b).
5The Frisch labor supply elasticity refers to the substitution effect associated with a
change in the wage rate. It is the percent change in a person’s labor supply in response to
a change in the real wage, holding the marginal utility of consumption fixed.
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piwt = α + γp¯i
p
t−1 + βEt{piwt+1 − p¯ipt−1} − λϕ(ut − un) (7)
As in the original Phillips curve, the augmented NKWPC outlines the ex-
istence of an inverse relation between wage inflation and the unemployment
rate. However, unlike the original Phillips curve, the NKWPC is a micro-
founded structural relation with coefficients that are functions of structural
parameters. In particular, note that the slope of the curve (given expected
wage inflation) is decreasing in the degree of wage rigidity θ (i.e. the propor-
tion of workers changing wage each period, which is inversely related to λ).6In
addition, expectations play an important role for wage setting in the NKWPC.
Indeed, by solving (7) forward we obtain:
piwt = α + γp¯i
p
t−1 − λϕ
∞∑
k=0
βkEt{(ut+k − un)} (8)
which implies that wage inflation is a forward looking variable inversely
related to the discounted sum of the current and future unemployment rates.
To derive a reduced form representation of the previous NKWP, Gali (2011)
considers an exogenous and stationary AR(2) as follows:
uˆt = φ1uˆt−1 + φ2uˆt−2 + t (9)
6This slope is also decreasing in the size of the Frisch labor supply elasticity which in
inversely related to ϕ.
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where uˆt = ut − un. Combining (9) with the augmented NKWPC yields
the following reduced form representation of the wage inflation equation:
piwt = α + γp¯i
p
t−1 + ψ0uˆt + ψ1uˆt−1 (10)
where the parameters ψ0 and ψ1 are defined as:
ψ0 ≡ − λϕ
1− β(φ1 + βφ2)
ψ1 ≡ − λϕβφ2
1− β(φ1 + βφ2)
It is important to remark that the previous reduced form equation holds
if the cross-equation restriction ψ1 = ψ0βφ2 is verified. In this case, the wage
inflation equation should have a negative coefficient on the current unemploy-
ment rate and a positive one on its lag, in addition to a positive coefficient on
lagged price inflation in the presence of indexation. Within this context, the
slope of the wage inflation equation corresponds to λϕ in Equations (7) and
(8) where λϕ = −ψ0(1− β(φ1 + βφ2)).
Note also that under certain conditions, the reduced form NKWPC takes
the same form as the original equation of Phillips. Indeed, it is easy to verify
that if the unemployment rate follows an AR(1) model such as:
uˆt = φ1uˆt−1 + t (11)
14
Combining (11) with the augmented NKWPC gives the following reduced
form equation for wage inflation:
piwt = α + γp¯i
p
t−1 + ψ0uˆt (12)
where the parameter ψ0 is defined as:
ψ0 ≡ − λϕ
1− βφ1
In this particular case, 0 < φ1 < 1 and ψ0 < 0 must be verified.
Therefore, a successful application of Eq.(10) to data requires the following
steps:
1. Define the suitable autoregressive process for the unemployment rate; in
particular, the following properties must be verified in Eq (9): φ1 > 1
and −1 < φ2 < 0 ;
2. Test for the hypothesis 0 < φ1 + φ2 < 1 in Eq (9), a requirement for
stationarity;
3. Estimate the system formed by Equations (9) and (10) and verify that
ψ0 < 0 , ψ1 > 0 and −(ψ0 + ψ1) > 0;
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4. Test the cross-equation restriction ψ1 = ψ0βφ2 in the previous system by
OLS
5. Compute the implied estimates of the slope of the wage-unemployment
curve and Calvo wage rigidity parameter, conditional on calibrated values
for ϕ and . The Calvo wage rigidity parameter is obtained, conditional
on calibrated values for β, ϕ and , by solving for θ in the expression
of the parameter λ.7 In this case, β and ϕ are set to 0.99 and 1, as
it is usually the case in the literature, and  is such that it is a value
consistent with the average unemployment rate over the sample period
considered.
3 Data Definition and Results
3.1 Data definition
We use quarterly data on unemployment rate, consumer price index (CPI) and
hourly manufacturing wages from the OECD Economic Outlook Database for
the 1985q1-2014q3 period. Wage and price inflation correspond to year-to-year
change of the (log) wage and CPI, respectively. The countries covered are:
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Regarding our
7More precisely, the expression of ψ0 allows us to calculate the parameter λ and solve for
θ in the following equation: 1− θ(β + 1 + (1 + ϕ)λ) + βθ2 = 0.
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measures of labour market rigidity, we consider the average Employment Pro-
tection Legislation (EPL) provided by the OECD for the 1985-2014 period.
This index measures the strictness of employment protection for individual
and collective dismissals and for regular contracts. The EPL index scores from
0 to 6 with higher values representing stricter regulation.
We also consider the adjusted bargaining coverage rate for the 1985-2011
period, provided by the Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) from the
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (University of Amsterdam).
This indicator has the advantage of providing data on employees covered by
wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in
employment with the right to bargaining (expressed as percentage), adjusted
for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right
to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing
the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers
in employment).
From the same source, we also used a wage bargaining coordination index,
which is a categorical variable taking the value of 1 (fragmented bargaining,
mostly at company level) to 5 (economy-wide bargaining, based on enforceable
agreements between the central organizations of unions and employers affect-
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ing the entire economy or entire private sector, or on government imposition of
a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling). Our last indicator for labor market insti-
tution is the government intervention in the wage bargaining process, with the
lowest value indicating that the government influences wage bargaining by pro-
viding an institutional framework of consultation and information exchange,
etc. The higher value, on the contrary, implies that the government imposes
private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on bargaining outcomes or
suspends bargaining.
3.2 Estimation results
Table 1 presents the system estimated coefficients of the reduced form NKWPC
equations for the 1985q1-2014q3 period.8 As mentioned before, conditional on
lagged price inflation and with an AR(2) process for the unemployment rate,
the reduced form wage inflation equation should have a negative coefficient
on the current unemployment rate and a positive one on its first lag. Besides,
this model involves the cross-equation restriction ψ1 = ψ0.β.φ2, which is tested
conditional on values for β (set to 0.99). Conversely, with an AR(1) process
for the unemployment rate, the equation becomes the traditional augmented
Phillips curve.
[INSERT table 1]
8The system equations consists of two equations, the simple autoregressive process for
the unemployment rate and the wage inflation equation.
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As seen in the table 1, in Austria, Germany and the United States the
autoregressive process for the unemployment rate is an AR(1). Moreover, ψ0
and ψ1 in Eq.(10) do not have the correct sign in Germany and the USA.
9 In
the rest of countries the system is estimated with an AR(2) process, with any
further lags of the unemployment rate not being significant.
Turning to the wage inflation equation, the results show that real wage
rigidities, introduced through implicit indexation of wages to prices (γ in table
1), appear to be more relevant in Europe than in Japan or the United States.
Indeed, while this coefficient is close to unity in Finland, Italy or Spain, wage
indexation is bellow 0.3 in non European countries.
The results also show that the coefficients on the unemployment rate have
the predicted signs.10 Indeed, for most of the countries, the estimated coef-
ficients are negative and significant for current unemployment (ψ0) and pos-
itive for its first lag (ψ1). Moreover, the conditions −(ψ0 + ψ1) > 0 and
0 < φ1 + φ2 < 1 are both satisfied for all the countries which have an AR(2)
process.1112
9Muto and Shintani (2014) confirm this result for the case of the United States. In
Austria, an AR(1) process for the unemployment rate results in a better fit than the AR(2).
10To have a better fit, in Ireland the price inflation variable is pipt−4 instead of pi
p
t−1 as in
the rest of the countries.
11Except for Finland, where ψ0 + ψ1 is not statistically significant.
12Since φ1 < 1 in Denmark, an AR(1) process would be also pertinent for this country.
The results also indicate that the case of Germany should be taken with caution since φ1 is
higher than one in the AR1, implying that the process is not stationary.
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As mentioned above, the slope of structural-form NKWPC is decreasing in
the degree of wage rigidity, which is inversely related to λ. Also, it is decreasing
in the size of the Frisch labor supply elasticity which is the inverse of ϕ. As can
seen in Table 1, the slope of estimated NKWPC is substantial in Austria, Japan
and Norway, implying a low nominal wage rigidity. Conversely, it is clearly
flat, i.e the value of λϕ is very small, in Spain, Ireland and, surprisingly, in the
USA.
Table 1 also reports the point estimates for the Calvo parameter, θ, which
are obtained by conditioning on calibrated values for β, ϕ and .13 As the
Calvo parameter is the fraction of workers keeping their wage unchanged in
any given period, the higher this parameter, the higher the wage rigidity.
[INSERT table 2]
It is interesting to see that there are large divergences in the estimated
wage rigidity parameter across countries –even among European countries–
that is usually not considered in the theoretical literature.14 Indeed, the Calvo
parameter ranges from 0.14 (Japan) to 0.86 (Spain). The countries that appear
13Recall that ϕ, the inverse of Frisch labor supply, is set to 1 in the benchmark equation
and  is set to a value consistent with the average unemployment rate over the sample period
estimated. We acknowledge that the value of ϕ is controversial. Therefore, we also calibrate
the models for an inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity equal to 5 (see table 2). Regarding ,
it is obtained given the mean unemployment rate and the fact that  = (1− exp{−ϕun})−1.
14Most of the literature assumes a Calvo parameter of 0.75. For instance, ? consider a
Calvo parameter of about 0.75 for a ϕ equal to 5 for the Euro Area, which is higher than
our estimated mean for these countries (0.61). Moreover, their assumed parameter does
not take into account the important differences in terms of wage rigidity among European
countries.
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less rigid are Austria, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.These results
confirm the very low wage rigidity in Japan, at least when compared to the
United States and to the majority of the European countries (see for instance,
Muto and Shintani (2014)). Indeed, it is well know that in Japan, labour
market adjustments take place through wage variations rather than in the
employment for the ”core workers”. Given that national wages are indexed to
wages of these workers, we observe flexibility at the aggregate level. Under this
scenario, an important implication of this flexibility is that periods of deflation
cannot be mitigated by the rigidity of nominal wages in this country.
A second group of European countries (Sweden, France, Denmark and
Finland) is in an intermediate position, with a parameter ranging from 0.54
(France) to 0.63 (Denmark). Finally, the USA is among the countries with
higher wage rigidity, with a Calvo parameter equal to 0.74.15 Surprisingly,
wage rigidity in the USA appears to be much higher than in many European
countries, even if the labor market in the USA is considered to be much more
flexible. For instance, our results suggest that wages in France are less rigid
than in the USA, even though labor market institutions in the first country are
stronger than in the USA. This result confirms previous studies on macroeco-
nomic wage curves that conclude that the United States in no more flexible
than some European countries (see for instance Heyer, Reynes, and Sterdy-
15Our estimated parameter is similar to the 0.79 in Gali (2011) for the 1964-2010 period.
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niak (2007)). Thus, the link between institutions and wages rigidity is not
straightforward at the macroeconomic level.
In the context of the Euro, an internal devaluation mechanism (through
relative price adjustment) may be a substitute to an external devaluation. In
particular, wage flexibility is often proposed as a substitute to exchange rates
adjustments, at least partially to ensure stability of the euro zone. However,
the Calvo parameter appears very high in Spain and Italy, implying a sub-
stantial rigidity of nominal wages, strengthening adjustment problems in the
Monetary Union.
With this in mind, we analyzed if wage rigidity can be explained by the
labour market institutional setting. Indeed, the heterogeneity of individual
country experiences are often explained by the interaction between adverse
shocks, such as the slowdown of labour productivity, rises in real interest
rates, oil price shocks, etc, and labour market institutions (e.g. Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000), Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2001), Nickell, Nunziata, and
Ochel (2005)). Thus, the standard policy recommendation to fight the poor
employment performance is labour market flexibilization, supplemented with
expansionary monetary policy in some cases (Blanchard (2006)).
Taking into account the results by previous authors, we considered the
role of the employment protection legislation (EPL), union coverage, wage
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coordination and government intervention in the bargaining process. Figure 1
shows the slope of the structural-form NKWPC and the Calvo wage rigidity
parameter versus these institutional indicators. As seen, no clear relationship
can be found between labour market institutions and wage rigidity, confirming
previous results at the macroeconomic level (Mazier and Saglio (2008)). For
instance, even with very low employment protection legislation in the United
States and Ireland, nominal wage rigidity at the aggregate level is relatively
high compared to other European countries. In contrast, Netherlands and
Portugal have very high EPL although wage rigidity is well below the average
of the sample. The relationship between the (adjusted) coverage rate, the
government intervention and wage coordination is no more clear.16
[INSERT figure1]
A further interesting question that emerges when dealing with wage rigidity
is its link with the unemployment rate. Indeed, if wage flexibility is an ad-
justment mechanism to absorb external shocks and accommodate employment
variations, countries with low wage rigidity should exhibit low unemployment
rates. Our motivation to address this issue is that some labour market theo-
16Results based on micro-data are no less conclusive. For instance, Holden and Wulfsberg
(2008) show that downward nominal wage rigidity in OECD countries is higher in cases
where employment protection legislation is stricter and union density and inflation higher.
Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) also show that lower unemployment is associated with lower
nominal wage rigidity. Dickens, et. al (2007), in turn, find a positive but weak correlation
coefficient between EPL and nominal rigidity and even lower correlation between rigidity
and union density.
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ries explain the persistence of unemployment by the presence of wage rigidities,
particularly downward wage rigidity, that hinders the adjustment of wages to
labour market disequilibria (see for instance, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991)). As such, the high and persistent levels of unemployment rate in the
European countries since the 1980s generated a large literature that concluded
that the main cause of this unemployment was the ill-adapted labour market
institutions that prevented complete adjustment in the labour market (Layard,
Nickell, and Jackman (1991)).
At this respect, Figure 1 also plots the slope of the structural-form NKWPC
versus the mean unemployment rate for the period. In addition, the correlation
between the slope or the Calvo parameter and the mean unemployment rate is
quite high (-0.59 with the slope and 0.73 with the Calvo parameter). Yet, the
last correlation is difficult to interpret since the Calvo parameter is linked to the
average unemployment rate through . In contrast, the slope of the structural-
form NKWPC depends on wage stickiness (λ) and labor supply elasticity (ϕ),
but not on the average unemployment rate on the estimated period. As seen in
the figure, a lower mean unemployment rate is associated with a steeper slope
(see Austria, Japan, Norway and Netherlands). Conversely, Spain and Ireland
have a high average unemployment rate and a flat slope. The most notably
exception is the United States, where low unemployment is associated with a
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very low slope and thus a substantial wage stickiness at the macroeconomic
level.
Finally, we assess the model’s stability over time through a rolling analysis
with windows of 60 observations. The idea behind this exercise is threefold.
First, we want to shed some new light on the link between wage dynamics and
the monetary policy regime. Indeed, there is in fact evidence supporting the
conjecture that wage indexation has not been constant over time and could be
linked to the inflation regime (?). Second, there is a large literature suggesting
that the slope of the Phillips curve has flattened over time. This proposal
implies that wages have become less responsive to the unemployment rate.17
Third, the institutional setting has changed in most of the countries under
analysis, becoming less rigid. If rigid labor market institutions prevent the
adjustment of wages to demand or supply shocks, we should expect higher
nominal wage flexibility in recent years. In other words, as the steepness of
the slope is decreasing in the degree of wage rigidity, the curve should become
vertical.
Figure 2 illustrate significant time variation in the estimated coefficient
of the lagged inflation term that is coherent with the conjecture that wage
17One argument is that globalization may lead to higher labor mobility. This could lead
to flattening of the Phillips curve if it results in declining sensitivity of service sector wages
and prices to domestic demand shifts. In particular, workers may not press for higher wages
when the domestic labor market tightens for fear that their jobs may be taken by foreign
labor.
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indexation could be linked to the monetary policy regime. Specifically, the
figures show that, in most countries, the impact of lagged price inflation on
wage inflation was relatively high at the beginning of our sample period, after
which we observe a decline to an insignificant impact in the last windows.
Hence, the pegging of nominal wage growth to the rate of inflation seems to
fall steadily as inflation stabilizes at lower levels. At the extreme, drastic price
drops or even deflation in some countries in recent years seem to be associated
with a sharp movement away from wage indexation.
[INSERT Figure 2]
The results of the rolling regression also show that the value of the slope
(λϕ) is not stable in most countries (see Figure 3). At the end of the period,
the slope is much steeper in Japan, Norway and Sweden.18 In France, the
estimated coefficient shows a downward trend since the mid of the 1990’s,
pointing to a pronounced wage flexibility. Remark that even if it declines
since the end of the 1990’s, its level (in absolute value) remains very low in the
USA. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of the slope in Spain and Finland
are very low and even become positive since the mid of the 1990’s, implying
a positive relation between wage inflation and unemployment. The rolling
coefficients for the Calvo wage rigidity parameter, presented in Figure 4 are in
18Note that the estimated coefficient of the slope in absolute value is particularly high in
Japan.
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line to those of the slope.19
[INSERT Figure 3]
[INSERT Figure 4]
3.3 Robustness tests
In the NKWPC, the growth of productivity is taken into account in the index-
ation rule but with the assumption that labor productivity grows at a constant
rate in the long run. We relax this assumption by subtracting the trend com-
ponent of labor productivity growth from wages.20 Table 3 shows the results
of this exercise. As seen, most of the findings appear to be robust to the use
of the alternative specification. In particular, there is no noticeable difference
between the point estimates for the Calvo parameter in both cases.21
[INSERT Table 3]
We also estimate the reduced-form NKWPC equation with four periods
lagged inflation terms. Table 4 shows the main results: the estimated inflation
indexation (
∑
γ), the value of the slope (λ.ϕ) and the Calvo parameter (θ).
19When the discriminant of the quadratic equation is negative there is no solution for θ,
explaining the discontinuity of the Calvo rolling parameters in Finland, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden and the United States.
20The trend component is calculated using a Hodrick Prescott filter.
21We also verify the direct the potential influence of changes in labor productivity growth
on wage inflation by introducing labor productivity growth as an explanatory variable in
the equation. The results, not presented here to save space, remain similar, pointing to the
robustness of our findings.
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Even though one lag is sufficient to capture the dynamics in the system in
most cases, adding the first four quarters to the indexation shows that the
results remain robust, except in Japan, Portugal and the UK. In particular,
indexation becomes stronger in the last two countries and negative in Japan.
The effect on the slope and on the Calvo parameter is also important in the
UK, where rigidity increases substantially. However, in most countries, there
is no noticeable difference between the NKWPC estimates with one or four
lagged period(s) as an indexing variable.
[INSERT Table 4]
Finally, we estimate the system equations for the 1985q1-2007q4 period.
The objective in this case is to prevent our estimates from being distorted by
binding downward nominal wage rigidities during the most recent recession.
Table 5 reports the main results for this period. Note that the coefficients
on price indexation, current and lagged unemployment remain unaffected in
most of the countries. Interestingly, however, the point estimates of θ, the
Calvo wage rigidity parameter, are higher than those obtained in the previous
section. This result suggest that during the Great Recession nominal wages
became more flexible. The rapid increase in unemployment during these years
probably means that more workers were pushed to adjust wages (downward).
[INSERT Table 5]
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we assess quantitatively the wage inflation-unemployment rela-
tionship. By relying on the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve, we provide
estimates of wage rigidity at the macroeconomic level for European countries,
Japan, and the USA and for the 1985q1-2014q3 period.
A number of key results emerge from our analysis. First, the estimated
coefficients in the implied wage equation have the predicted signs and are
significant for all countries. Thus, the reduced form NKWPC equation can
be seen as an empirically plausible model which provides an inverse relation-
ship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate that is determined by
structural parameters such as wage stickiness and labor supply elasticity.
Second, we find international structural differences in the wage determi-
nation process at the macroeconomic level. Regarding real wage rigidity, we
identify three groups of countries. The first group includes countries with
relatively flexible nominal wages (Austria, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and
Norway). In the Netherlands, the so-called “Dutch miracle” relies in part on
its strong wage moderation. Quite paradoxically, Norway, which has the high-
est downward wage flexibility in Europe, does not belong to the European
Monetary Union and, thus, it can adjust relative prices through its nominal
exchange rate. The second group includes countries with relatively high real
29
wage rigidity (Ireland, Spain and the USA). Finally, the rest of countries are in
an intermediate position. Yet the nature of wage rigidity seems to be different
across countries: whereas in the US there is substantial resistance to nomi-
nal wage cuts, stronger wage indexation translates into downward real wage
rigidity in Europe.
Third, a rolling analysis reveals that the value of the slope of NKWPC
and, thus, wage rigidity, is instable in most countries. For instance, our results
suggest that during the Great Recession nominal wage became more flexible
in a group of countries. Moreover, wage indexation appears to be linked to the
monetary policy regime. In particular, disinflation is associated with a sharp
movement away from wage indexation.
Finally, no clear relationship seems to appear between institutional indi-
cators of the labor market and nominal wage rigidity. In contrast, in most
cases, a lower mean unemployment rate is associated with a steeper slope
of the implied wage equation. One of the exceptions is the USA where low
unemployment is associated with a flat slope.
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Table 2: NKWPC Calvo parameters with ϕ = 1 and ϕ = 5. 1985q1-2014q2
θ with ϕ = 1 θ with ϕ = 5
Austria 0.22 0.23
Denmark 0.63 0.63
Finland 0.62 0.63
France 0.54 0.55
Germany 0.83 0.83
Ireland 0.84 0.84
Italy 0.74 0.75
Japan 0.14 0.36
Netherlands 0.43 0.44
Norway 0.21 0.21
Portugal 0.40 0.41
Spain 0.86 0.76
Sweden 0.56 0.57
UK 0.41 0.42
USA 0.74 0.86
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Appendix
Table 3: NKWPC Calvo parameters subtracting labor productivity trend from
wages. 1985q1-2014q2
θ θg
Coeff. Coeff.
Austria 0.22 0.33
Denmark 0.63 0.59
Finland 0.62 0.60
France 0.54 0.56
Germany 0.83 0.70
Ireland 0.84 0.86
Italy 0.74 0.78
Japan 0.14 0.23
Netherlands 0.43 0.49
Norway 0.21 0.23
Portugal 0.40 0.43
Spain 0.86 0.76
Sweden 0.56 0.51
UK 0.41 0.41
USA 0.74 0.76
Notes: (1) θ and θg are the Calvo point estimates in the benchmark equation and
subtracting labour productivity, respectively. In Austria and the USA, the specification is
the reduced-form NKWPC with labor productivity growth introduced as an explanatory
variable.
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Table 4: Main NKWPC estimates with four-periods lagged inflation as an
indexing variable. 1985q1-2014q2∑
γ −λϕ θ
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Austria 0.77
(5.74)
-0.0973 0.22
Denmark 0.79
(8.12)
-0.0111 0.63
Finland 0.94
(10.92)
-0.0268 0.56
France 0.59
(17.53)
-0.0384 0.51
Germany 0.57
(5.36)
-0.0020 0.83
Ireland 0.68
(7.94)
-0.0036 0.80
Italy 0.92
(22.68)
-0.0168 0.63
Japan −0.63
(−3.37)
-0.1098 0.20
Netherlands 0.78
(12.64)
-0.0461 0.38
Norway 0.87
(12.56)
-0.1116 0.20
Portugal 0.14
(1.12)
-0.0774 0.36
Spain 1.07
(17.05)
-0.0031 0.84
Sweden 0.40
(6.99)
-0.0243 0.52
UK 0.13
(7.79)
-0.0114 0.65
USA 0.28
(4.28)
-0.0046 0.74
Notes: (1)
∑
γ is the sum of four lagged terms for inflation.
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Figure 1: Slope and wage rigidity of the structural-form NKWPC
versus institutional labour market indicators
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Figure 2: Rolling estimation of the indexation term in the NKXPC
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Figure 3: Rolling estimation of the slope in the NKXPC
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Figure 4: Rolling estimation of the Calvo wage rigidity index
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